Abstract. The process algebras Timed Mobility (TiMo) and its extension Permissions, Timers and Mobility (PerTiMo) were recently proposed to support engineering applications in distributed system design. TiMo provides a formal framework in which process migration between distinct locations and timing constraints linked to local clocks can be modelled and analysed. This is extended in PerTiMo by associating access permissions to communication to model security aspects of a distributed system. In this paper we develop a new semantic model for TiMo using Rewriting Logic (RL) and strategies, with the aim of providing a foundation for tool support; in particular, strategies are used to capture the locally maximal concurrent step of a TiMo specification which previously required the use of action rules based on negative premises. This RL model is then extended with access permissions in order to develop a new semantic model for PerTiMo. These RL semantical models are formally proved to be sound and complete with respect to the original operational semantics on which they were based. We present examples of how the developed RL models for TiMo and PerTiMo can be implemented within the strategy-based rewriting system Elan and illustrate the range of (behavioural) properties that can be analysed using such a tool.
Introduction
The process algebras Timed Mobility (TiMo) [CiK08] and its extension Permissions, Timers and Mobility (PerTiMo) [CiK11b, CiK14] were recently proposed to support engineering applications in distributed system design. In TiMo processes can migrate between distinct locations and timers linked to local clocks are used to control mobility and communication actions. The resulting semantic approach based on local maximal concurrency is motivated by the assumptions made by the GALS approach [Das06] , which specifies that systems operate under a 'globally asynchronous/locally synchronous' execution strategy. The behaviour of TiMo specifications can be captured using a set of SOS rules or suitable Petri nets [CiK11a] , both based on executing time actions with negative premises (i.e. premises which ensure that no other alternative actions are applicable). PerTiMo is an extension of TiMo which associates access permissions with communication actions in order to model security aspects of a distributed system [CiK11b, CiK14] . Moreover, processes are able to acquire new access permissions, or lose some of their current access permissions while moving between locations, modelling an important security feature.
In this paper, we present new semantic models for TiMo and PerTiMo with the aim of providing a basis for much needed tool support and a formal framework for investigating the different semantic options available. We use Rewriting Logic (RL) [Mes92] , an algebraic formalism for modelling dynamic systems which uses equational specifications to define the states of a system, and rewrite rules to capture the dynamic state transitions. Strategies [BKKR01, BKKM02] are an integral part of RL and provide control over the rewriting process, allowing important dynamic properties to be modelled.
We develop an RL model for TiMo which involves formulating a strategy that captures the maximal parallel computational step of a TiMo specification, including its time rule based on negative premises. The resulting RL model is formally validated by showing that it is both sound and complete with respect to the original operational semantics of TiMo. To illustrate using the RL semantics as a basis for tool support we use the strategy-based rewrite system Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02] to simulate and analyse TiMo specifications. The simple example we provide gives a useful insight into the proposed RL modelling approach and illustrates the type of (behavioural) properties that can be analysed. This work extends the initial research on modelling TiMo presented in [CKS12] .
In order to specify and reason about access permissions for mobility and communication in a distributed environment the TiMo framework has been extended with access permissions. PerTiMo [CiK11b, CiK14] is a formal framework for specifying interprocess communication controlled by access permissions that processes must possess in order to send and receive information. Access permissions are dynamic, and processes acquire and lose access permissions when migrating between locations. We consider how to modify our RL model for TiMo to develop a new semantic model for PerTiMo. This provides a basis for tool support for PerTiMo and also illustrates the flexibility and extendibility provided by using the RL framework. The resulting RL model is prototyped again using Elan and formally validated against the original PerTiMo semantics.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the syntax and semantics of TiMo and introduces a small illustrative example. Section 3 briefly introduces RL and the idea of rewriting strategies. In Sect. 4, we develop an RL model of TiMo and provide a formal argument for its correctness. A simple example of the RL model is then implemented using the support tool Elan and the type of properties that can be analysed using our approach are illustrated. In Sect. 5 we introduce PerTiMo and extend our RL model with access permissions to provide a new semantic model for PerTiMo. The resulting RL model is formally shown to be correct and Elan is again used to implement a small illustrative example. Finally, in Sect. 6 we conclude by discussing related work and by considering areas for future work.
TiMo (Timed Mobility Language)
TiMo (Timed Mobility) [CiK08, CiK11a, CiK11b, CiK14] is a process algebra for mobile systems where it is possible to add timers to the basic actions, and each location runs according to its own local clock which is invisible to processes. Processes have communication capabilities which are active up to a predefined time deadline. Other timing constraints specify the latest time for moving between locations.
We assume suitable data types together with associated operations, including a set Loc of locations, a set Chan of communication channels, and a set I d of process identifiers, where each id ∈ I d has arity m id . We use x to denote a finite tuple of elements (x 1 , . . . , x k ) whenever it does not lead to a confusion.
The syntax of TiMo is given in Table 1 , where P represents processes and N represents networks. Moreover, for each id ∈ I d, there is a unique process definition (Def), where the u i 's are distinct variables playing the role of parameters; the X id i 's are data types, and P id is a process expression which may make use of the variables u i . In Table 1 , it is assumed that: (i) a ∈ Chan is a channel, and t ∈ N ∪ {∞} represents a timeout; (ii) each v i is an expression built from data values and variables; (iii) each u i is a variable, and each X i is a data type; (iv) l is a location or a location variable; and (v) is a special symbol used to state that a process is temporarily 'stalled'.
The only variable binding construct is a t ? ( u: X ) then P else P which binds the variables u within P (but not within P ). We use f v(P ) to denote the free variables of a process P (and similarly for networks). For a process definition as in (Def), we assume that f v(P id ) ⊆ {u 1 , . . . , u m id }, and so the free variables of P id are parameter bound. Processes are defined up to the alpha-conversion, and {v /u, . . .}P is obtained from P by replacing all free occurrences of a variable u by v , etc, possibly after alpha-converting P in order to avoid clashes. Moreover, if v and u are tuples of the same length then { v / u}P denotes {v 1 /u 1 , v 2 /u 2 , . . . , v k /u k }P . A process a t ! v then P else P attempts to send a tuple of values v over the channel a for t time units. If successful, it continues as process P ; otherwise it continues as the alternative process P . A process a t ? ( u: X ) then P else P attempts for t time units to input a tuple of values of type X and substitute them for the variables u. Mobility is implemented by a process go t l then P which moves from the current location to the location l within t time units. Note that since l can be a variable, and so its value is assigned dynamically through communication with other processes, migration actions support a flexible scheme for moving processes around a network. Processes are further constructed from the (terminated) process stop and parallel composition P |P . Finally, process expressions of the form P are a purely technical device which is used in the subsequent formalisation of structural operational semantics of TiMo; intuitively, specifies that a process P is temporarily (i.e., until a clock tick) stalled and so cannot execute any action. A located process l [[P ]] is a process running at location l , and a network is composed out of its components N | N .
As an illustrative example, consider a simple workflow example in which a processing job moves from an initial location to a web service location and finally to a done location. If an error occurs with the web service then the job enters an error location. A pictorial representation of this example is given in Fig. 1 (TM) and N et(TM) represent the set of well-formed TiMo process and network terms respectively. The first component of the operational semantics of TiMo is the structural equivalence ≡ on networks. It is the smallest congruence such that the equalities (Eq1-Eq3) in Table 2 hold. Using (Eq1-Eq3) one can always transform a given network N into a finite parallel composition of networks of the form
] such that no process P i has the parallel composition operator at its topmost level. Each subnetwork
is called a component of N , the set of all components is denoted by comp(N ), and the parallel composition is called a component decomposition of the network N . Note that these notions are well defined since component decomposition is unique up to the permutation of the components. This follows from the rule (Call) which treats recursive definitions as function calls which take a unit of time. Another consequence of such a treatment is that it is impossible to execute an infinite sequence of action steps without executing any local clock ticks.
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That is, a derivation is a condensed representation of a sequence of individual actions followed by a clock tick, all happening at the same location. In other words, for any multiset of actions , any permutation of the individual actions in corresponds to the same derivation (see Proposition 2 in [CiK11a] ). Thus a derivation captures the cumulative effect of the concurrent (i.e. interleaved) execution of the multiset of actions at location l . It is important to note that the semantical treatment of TiMo goes beyond interleaving semantics by introducing an explicit representation of maximal concurrency in the execution of actions. We say that N is directly reachable from N . Whenever there is only a time progression at a location, we have N ∅ ⇒ N . As an example, consider three derivation steps in the workflow network:
{W eb@I nit,serv@I nit}
One can show that derivations are well defined as one cannot execute an unbounded sequence of action moves without time progressing, and the execution is made up of independent (or concurrent) individual executions (see explanation above). Moreover, derivations preserve well-formedness of networks (see [CiK08] ).
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Rewriting logic and strategies
Rewriting logic (RL) [Mes92] is an algebraic specification approach which is able to model dynamic system behaviour. In RL the static properties of a system are described by a standard algebraic specification (see [EhM85, MeT92] ), whereas the dynamic behaviour of the system is modelled using rewrite rules. Rewrite strategies are then used to control the application of rewrite rules and allow an RL specification to capture subtle aspects of a dynamic system. A brief introduction to RL and rewriting strategies is presented below (for a more detailed introduction see [Mes92, BKKM02] ).
An S -sorted signature defines a collection of function symbols, where: c : s ∈ means c is a constant symbol of sort s ∈ S ; and
means f is a function symbol in of domain type s(1) . . . s(n), arity n, and codomain type s. Let X X s | s ∈ S be a family of sets of variables. We let T ( , X ) T ( , X ) s | s ∈ S be the family of sets of all terms over and X . For any term t ∈ T ( , X ) s , we let V ar(t) ⊆ ∪ s∈S X s represent the set of variables used in t. We let T ( , X )/E represent the free quotient algebra of terms with respect to a set of equations E over and X . For for any term t ∈ T ( , X ) s , we let t E represent the equivalence class of term t with respect to the equations E (see [MeT92] ).
In RL a specification ( , E ) defines the states t E of a system. The dynamic behaviour of the system is then specified by rewrite rules [Mes92, BKKM02] :
for terms l , r ∈ T ( , X ) s and s ∈ S , where V ar(r ) ⊆ V ar(l ). Such rules represent dynamic transitions between states l E and r E . We also allow rules to be labelled and to contain conditions:
where lb is a (not necessarily unique) label, c ∈ T ( , X ) bool and V ar(c) ⊆ Var (l ). Intuitively, the condition means that the rewrite rule can only be applied if term c rewrites to true. A Rewriting logic specification is therefore a triple Spec ( , E , R) consisting of an algebraic specification ( , E ) and a set of (conditional) rewrite rules R over and X .
As an example of an RL specification consider a model of a simple dynamic system in which states are multisets of symbols A, B , and C . The resulting RL specification Spec(M S)
( , E , R) is defined as follows. Let S {ent, ms} be a sort set and let be an S -sorted signature which contains the following function symbols:
(where @ is used to indicate the position of an argument in a function symbol to allow for an infix notation). Note that the signature contains an implicit type coercion operator @ : ent → ms.) The set of equations E contains the equations which axiomatize the associative/commutative properties of a multi-set. Note that the rewrite rules defined below will be applied modulo these equations. Finally, we define R to contain the following three rewrite rules:
where m1 ∈ X ms . Let A ⊗ C be a multi-set representing the initial state of the system. Then the trace
represents one possible evolution of the system. Rewriting Logic provides the notion of a strategy for controlling the application of rewrite rules [BKKR01, BKKM02] . A strategy allows the user to specify the order in which rewrite rules are applied and the possible choices that can be made. The result of applying a strategy is the set of all possible terms that can be produced according to the strategy. A strategy is said to fail if it can not be applied (i.e. produces no results). The following is a brief overview of some elementary strategies (based on [BKKR01, BKKM02] 
The strategy search(i) repeatedly applies the strategy doStep looking for a multi-set term that satisfies the strategy f ound. It fails if the given maximum number of iterations i is reached. So to search for a multi-set term containing A ⊗ B ⊗ C we would define the strategy f ound by the following rewrite rule:
A range of tools have been developed for supporting rewriting logic and strategies, including: Vis01] ; and Tom [BBKMR07] . In this paper we have chosen to use Elan to implement our examples given its simple strategy language and the authors' experience with this tool.
Modelling TiMo using rewriting logic and strategies
In this section we develop a semantic model of TiMo using rewriting logic and strategies, and provide a formal argument of correctness.
Developing an RL model for TiMo
Given a TiMo specification TM we consider how to develop a corresponding RL model RL(TM) that correctly captures the meaning of TM. We begin by modelling the general concept of a process and network in RL.
Let S be the set of sorts in RL(TM) containing: nat for time; Chan for channels; V Loc, ALoc, and Loc for locations; Prs for processes. and N ets for networks. Coping with the parameter passing that occurs in communication requires careful consideration and for this reason the sort Loc is defined as the union of two subsorts: V Loc represents the input location variables; and ALoc represents the actual locations used in TM. Note for simplicity, we have restricted the parameters used in communication between processes within TM to a single location parameter. Extending this would be relatively straightforward and would involve adding the appropriate sorts to the sort set S (as has been done for locations).
The S -sorted signature RL(TM) for RL(TM) contains the following function symbols to capture the syntax for processes given in Table 1 :
The function symbol @ | @ is defined equationally to be associative and commutative as per the definition of TiMo. To model process definitions we add a function symbol id : s 1 . . . s n → Prs for each process identifier id(u 1 , . . . , u n : s 1 , . . . , s n ), where s i is assumed to be a well-defined data type in our model. Note that given we have restricted parameters to being locations only, each s i has to be one of the built in sorts nat, Chan or ALoc.
We then define the following function symbols to represent networks:
where @ | @ is again defined to be associative and commutative. We now need to formulate appropriate rewrite rules to begin to capture the intended semantics of TiMo. In the RL model developed here we choose the approach of forcing network components with the same location to merge (this turns out to be important since it simplifies the selection of a location to update). The above approach is realized using the rule al
. Clearly, such a rule is compatible with Eq 3 from Table  2 . Each network term will therefore have the form at 1 
where each location at i is unique and where each pt i will represent a set of parallel processes. Any process term which does not contain the parallel operator at its topmost level is referred to as an atomic process term. Each individual network location term will have the form
is an atomic process term. Next we consider how to model the action rules given in Table 2 within our RL model. First, we define two labelled rules to model the action rule (Move):
The two rules can both be applied when t > 0 and this leads to a non-deterministic choice between moving location or allowing time to pass. Note that if t 0 then only the rule that moves to a different location is applicable.
To model the synchronisation required for communication as defined by the action rule (Com) we have the following rule: which allow each process identifier id ∈ I d to be associated with a well-formed process expression P id (see the action rule (Call) in Table 2 ). In RL(TM), for each id ∈ I d we add a rewrite rule of the form:
where RL(P id ) is the process term that results from translating P id into RL(TM) and each u i is a variable of sort
(Note that when this rule is applied the variables u 1 , . . . , u n will be instantiated with values and therefore any instances of these variables in RL(P id ) will also be instantiated.)
The above labelled rules are collectively referred to as process transition rules and are used to define a strategy step that represents an update step as follows:
The strategy repeatedly applies the three process transition rules and makes use of the dc built-in strategy as the order the rules are applied in is irrelevant given that they act on disjoint sets of terms.
In TiMo the last step of any derivation involves applying the (Time) action rule which allows time to progress and removes all stall symbols. We model this by using a function tick(@) : Prs → Prs which is applied to the terms resulting from step. We define tick recursively as illustrated by the sample rules below:
To make the application of this function straightforward we overload tick so that it can be applied to networks by defining tick(@) : N ets → N ets by
Note that when using tick we restrict its application to a single location at anyone time to ensure time progression confirms to the TiMo semantics.
We can now formulate a rewrite rule oneStep in RL(TM) using the strategy step and function tick that models a derivation step in TM:
where n2 :
The pattern al [p] | n1 is used to match non-deterministically with a collection of network components (due to the associative/commutative property of @ | @) and so chooses the next location to update.
It is interesting to note that different semantic choices can be considered for TiMo by appropriately updating the oneStep strategy. For example, we could straightforwardly consider a synchronous semantics, introduce priorities to locations or add fairness assumptions. This provides further motivation for developing our RL model.
Correctness of RL model
Having developed an RL model for TiMo we now validate that it correctly captures the semantics of TiMo. We do this by showing that our model is sound (each step in our RL model represents a derivation step in TiMo) and complete (every derivation step possible in TiMo is represented in our RL model). In the sequel let TM be a TiMo specification and let RL(TM) be the corresponding RL model as defined in Sect. 4.1.
Not all the terms of sort Prs in RL(TM) represent valid processes in TM since they may contain the stall symbol S. Another problem can arise with the improper use of location variables, that is terms of sort V Loc, since all uses other than those in an input command need to be bound by an outer input command. We formalise what we mean by a valid process term by defining a function VP.
is defined recursively over the structure of process terms as follows:
We define val Prs(TM) {pt | pt ∈ T ( RL(TM) ) Prs and VP(pt, {}) } to be the set of all valid process terms and define the set val N et(TM) of valid network terms recursively by
It can be shown that oneStep preserves valid network terms.
Theorem 4.1 The strategy oneStep is well-defined with respect to valid network terms, i.e. for any net
Proof. By the definition of oneStep it suffices to consider a valid network location term of the form
where n > 0 and each pt i is an atomic process term. It can be seen that each process term pt i is involved in at most one process transition rule application when oneStep is applied. This gives four possible cases to consider. (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and that a [calls] rule is applied to it, i.e.
where pt is the process term RL(P id ) with variables u 1 , . . . , u n replaced by terms v 1 , . . . , v n . Clearly the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of oneStep. Since P id was a wellformed TiMo process expression it is straightforward to show that pt ∈ val Prs(TM) as required.
Case 3 Suppose pt i has the form go(nt, at 2 ) then pt and that a [move] rule is applied to it. Then we have two possible cases: i) Suppose that nt > 0 holds and that applying the [move] rule simply allows time to pass, i.e.
Since the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function, it can be seen that go(nt − 1, at 2 ) then pt must be a valid process term given that the original process term was. ii) Suppose that applying a [move] rule results in the process moving locations, i.e. produces the network term at 2 [S(pt)], which becomes at 2 [pt)] after applying tick. Since the original atomic process term was valid it follows that pt must be valid and so the resulting new network term must also be valid as required.
Case 4 Suppose that the [com] rule has been applied to two process terms pt i and pt j , for i j . That is, suppose We can define an interpretation mapping between TiMo terms in TM and terms in the corresponding RL model RL(TM) as follows.
Definition 2 The process term mapping σ Prs : Prs(TM) → val Prs(TM) is defined recursively by:
It is straightforward to show that σ Prs and σ Net are bijective mappings and thus have inverses. In order to show the correctness of the RL model we need to prove it is sound and complete with respect to TiMo (see Fig. 2 ).
We now show that for any TiMo specification TM the RL model RL(TM) defined in Sect. 4.1 is a sound and complete model of TM. Fig. 2 must commute. Proof. By the definition of oneStep and the notion of a derivation in TiMo it suffices to consider a valid network location term of the form
where n > 0 and each pt i is an atomic process term. It can be seen that each process term pt i is involved in at most one process transition rule application when oneStep is applied. This gives us four possible cases to consider. 
Case 1
where pt is the process term RL(P id ) with variables u 1 , . . . , u n replaced by terms v 1 , . . . , v n . Note that tick will remove the stall symbol and so the final atomic process term will be pt. Then by the action rule (Call) in Table  2 we have
The result follows since the stall symbol will be removed by the time progression step in TiMo. 
Prs (pt) ]] The results follows since the stall symbol will be removed by the time progression step in TiMo.
Case 4 Suppose that the [com] rule has been applied to two process terms pt i and pt j , for i j . That is, suppose
The instances of the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of oneStep. Then by the action rule (Com) in Table 2 we have
Prs (pt Proof. By the definition of a derivation in TiMo and the strategy oneStep it suffices to consider a well-formed network of the form
where n > 0 and each P i is an atomic process. Suppose at [[ P 1 | . . . | P n ]] ⇒ N , for some finite set of at-actions {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m }, m ≥ 0. Then it can be seen that each atomic process P i is involved in at most one at-action ψ i . We show that the at-action applied to each process P i is correctly captured by the oneStep strategy in the RL model. We have four possible cases to consider. Case 1: Suppose P i is not involved in any of the action rules (Call), (Move) and (Com) during the derivation
. Then by definition of oneStep we need to show that tick(σ Prs (P i )) results in the process σ Prs (P i ). Considering the possible form of P i gives us three subcases to consider: 
By the definition of time progression in TiMo there are two possibilities to consider. First, if nt > 0 then time is allowed to progress resulting in the process
Applying σ Prs to this process gives out(ct, nt − 1) < at 2 > then σ Prs (P 1 i ) else σ Prs (P 2 i ) and so by the definition of tick the result follows. Secondly, we could have nt 0 in which case the timer has expired and the resulting process is P 2 i . Again, by definition of tick it can be seen that the result follows. iii) Suppose P i is the process ct nt ? (vt : Loc) then P 1 j else P 2 j . Then the result follows by a similar argument to ii) above. id(v 1 , . . . , v n ) and that the action rule (Call) is applied, i.e.
Case 2 Suppose P i is the process
where the stall symbol is removed by the final time progression step. We have σ Prs (id(v 1 , . . . , v n )) id(v 1 , . . . , v n ) and so applying the [calls] rule to this term gives
where pt is the process term σ Prs (P id ) with variables u 1 , . . . , u n replaced by terms v 1 , . . . , v n . Note that tick will remove the stall symbol and so the final atomic process term will be pt. It is straightforward to see that σ Prs ({ v / u}P id ) pt as required. Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. It is then straightforward to see that
by the definition of σ Prs .
Case 4 Suppose the action rule (Com) has been applied to two processes P i and P j , for i j , i.e. 
where all occurrences of the stall symbol S will be removed by the tick function. It is then straightforward to see that 
An illustrative example
In this section we investigate using Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02], a strategy-based rewrite system, to implement a TiMo specification based on our RL model. We consider a small example which provides useful insight into the RL modelling approach used and illustrates the type of (behavioural) properties that can be analysed.
Recall the simple TiMo workflow example introduced in Sect. 2. The specification W F can be mapped into an RL model RL(W F) as described in Sect. 4.1 and then investigated using Elan to provide insight into the behaviour of the original TiMo specification. A range of (behavioural) properties can be analysed including time constraints, use of locations, and causality between actions. For example, consider the following initial TiMo network:
After translating this into RL(W F) we can use Elan to derive the following rewriting trace which shows how a processing job can reach the Done location: I nit[ job | serv(W eb)] | W eb[serv(Done)]
The example trace contains six derivation steps and indeed it is easy to verify using Elan that this is the smallest number of steps needed in order for a processing job starting at I nit to reach the Done location. Next we consider what happens if we change our network so that it contains a faulty service process:
Again, using Elan and a simple search strategy we are able to confirm that it is still possible for a processing job to reach the Done location. Furthermore, we can show that it is now possible for a processing job to end up in the Err location as the following term derived using Elan shows:
I nit[out(a, 2) < W eb > then serv(W eb) else serv(W eb)] | W eb[out(a, 2) < Err > then serv Err(Err) else serv Err(Err)] | Err[ job]

Extending the semantics with access permissions
In a distributed environment, processes need to possess sufficient access rights to migrate and communicate; moreover, such access permissions can dynamically change. In this section, we outline PerTiMo [CiK11b, CiK14] which extends TiMo with interprocess communication controlled by access permissions that processes must possess in order to send and receive information. Access permissions are dynamic and processes can acquire new access permissions, or lose some of their current access permissions while moving between locations, modelling an important security feature. To communicate over a channel at a given network location, the sender process should have a 'put' access permission, and the receiving process a 'get' access permission. In general, the set of access permissions of a process is a subset of the overall set of access permissions:
We use the notation get a@l to denote an access permission (get, a, l ) ∈ Acc Perm and put a@l to denote (put, a, l ) ∈ Acc Perm. Intuitively, we work with access permissions to sockets where l represents an IP address and a represents a communication port. Access permissions of a process change while moving from one location to another. To model this, we use the following four basic access permission modification operations:
where l is a location and a is a communication channel. The first two ( put 
For a given network, we then specify what are the changes to the access permission sets of processes migrating from one location to another. This is specified as an access permission modification mapping apmod which, for each pair of locations, returns a permission modification operation. Hence, if a process with the current access permissions moves from location l to location l , its new set of access permissions becomes apmod(l , l )( ). The syntax of PerTiMo extends that of TiMo with the notion of processes with access permissions P P :: P :
where P is a process defined exactly as in Table 1 and is a set of access permissions. Networks are then re-defined in the following way:
]] specifies a process P with the access permissions running at the location l . Other syntactic notions and assumptions are as those defined for TiMo, with obvious modifications resulting from the additions of sets of access permissions. The computational steps N ⇒ N of PerTiMo networks are defined following the same scheme as in the case of TiMo networks, except that some of the execution rules of Table 2 are modified to reflect the fact that now processes appearing in networks are equipped with sets of access permissions, and one new structural rule is added. Table 3 provides the necessary details. Two crucial rules there are (MoveP) and (ComP). The former reflects the change of access permissions applied to a migrating process, and the latter expresses the assumption that communications (send or receive) can only happen if processes possess suitable access permissions.
Note that now in the rule (Time), N → l means that the rules (CallP) and (ComP) as well as (MoveP) with t 0 cannot be applied to N for this particular location l . 
Similarly, as for TiMo, all PerTiMo networks directly reachable from a well-formed network also are wellformed, and so computational steps N ⇒ N are well-defined evolutions of well-formed networks (see [CiK11b, CiK14] ). Moreover, it is important to stress again that the semantical treatment of PerTiMo goes beyond interleaving semantics by introducing an explicit representation of maximal concurrency in the execution of actions.
We would like to stress that the above presentation of PerTiMo is semantically equivalent to that used in [CiK11b, CiK14] , even though the formalisation of the operational rules is slightly different, as we decided to keep the (Time) rule used in the formulation of TiMo.
As an illustrative example, consider a simple example in which processes attempt to gain access to a secure location. Only those processes that come initially from a trusted location Sa f e are allowed to obtain the address of the secure location Ar ea with processes from other originating locations being blocked. A pictorial representation of this example is given in Fig. 3 
where P is obtained from { v / u}P id by replacing each subexpression of the form id ( w ) with id ( w ) ↑n−1 . Moreover, stop ↑n df stop .
Safe access permissions
One of the problems which is central to designs expressed in PerTiMo is to ensure that a migrating process possesses a sufficiently rich set of initial access permissions so that whenever it attempts to communicate over a channel, it has the required access permission, irrespective of the other processes used in the construction of the system. (We then say that the process has safe access permissions.) This can be verified by taking into account that migrating processes have their access permission sets modified according to the mapping apmod. As a result, one can provide a solution to an important security problem related to migration and access permissions in the sense that one should rule out unauthorised attempts to communicate over the channels. The solution provided in [CiK11b, CiK14] , uses judgements of the form
to mean that a single-component well-formed network l [[ P : ]] has safe access permissions. Note that it may be impossible to find satisfying (1), for a given P and l , due to conflicts between access permission modifications resulting from migration and the subsequent communication. For example, if
and apmod(l , l ) put − a@l then there is no such that l P . Given a set of locations Loc together with the apmod mapping, as well as a process P and location l , one can devise typing rules for checking that a set of access permissions satisfies (1). These rules are given in Table 4 .
Returning to our PerTiMo example specification Check A P, we can observe that the process contained within Sa f e [[ req : ]] has safe access permissions, by applying the derivation rules of Table 4 , in the following way. First we observe that for any PerTiMo system, and for any , l and l we have:
Indeed, by (TStop) we have
Hence, by (TMove), (2) holds. We then observe that by (2) and (TStop), we have in our case: In the general case, a well-formed network N has safe access permissions if each of its parallel components has safe access permissions. Crucially, one can then show that networks with safe access permissions capture the desired notion of a guarantee of correct access to communication channels. More precisely, if N is a network reachable from a well-formed network with safe access permissions, then the following hold.
•
Moreover, one can also show that networks with safe access permissions are the only ones which enjoy the above properties regardless of an environment in which they are placed. We can therefore conclude that PerTiMo provides a sound and complete framework for ensuring safety of communication for networks of migrating processes. In particular, if safe access permissions for a part of a network can be established, one can simplify the checking of access permissions in the rule (ComP), simplifying the operational semantics rules for this part of the network and its descendants. The notion of safe access permissions is powerful, but it may prove too restrictive for practical applications where safe access permissions are guaranteed thanks, for example, to the specific timings of the processes involved, even though there may be environments in which illegal access may occur. For this we need a finer behavioural analysis. In particular, it can be done by extending the technique developed earlier in this paper, as discussed in the next section.
Extending the RL model to PerTiMo
In this section we consider extending our RL model of TiMo by incorporating access permissions. We show that the resulting RL model correctly captures the semantics of PerTiMo and thus provides an important basis for mechanising reasoning about PerTiMo models.
Given a PerTiMo specification TMP we consider how to develop a corresponding RL model RL(TMP) that correctly captures the meaning of TMP. The idea is to extend our RL model of the TiMo aspects of TMP by defining an appropriate RL specification for sets of access permissions. This involves introducing a range of new sorts and operations; the sort APT ype is introduced with associated constants put : APT ype and get : APT ype to represent the two permission types. Next the sort AP is added to represent access permissions. This sort has a constructor
So, for example, AP ( put, a, l ) represent an access permission to output data on a channel a when in location l . Sets of access permissions are represented by sort AP Set which has constant : AP for the empty set, the embedding operation @ : AP → AP Set to lift access permissions to singleton sets, a set union operation ∪ : AP Set AP Set → AP Set, and an operation (@ in @) : AP AP Set → bool for checking if an access permission is in a set or not (all of above are equationally axiomatised in the standard way [EhM85, MeT92] ).
Given the above abstract data type we can then associate a set of access permissions with a process and update the definition of networks so that they contain this new type of process. We introduce a new sort Prs A P for processes with access permissions and add a constructor (@ : @) : Prs A P Set → Prs A P Strategy based semantics for mobility with time and access permissions 543 which pairs up processes and sets of access permissions. A (commutative, associative) parallel composition operator @ | @ : Prs A P Prs A P → Prs A P is added for processes with access permissions. The structural rules allow the conditional bi-directional transfer between the normal process parallel composition operator and this new operator (see Table 3 ). We take the approach of prioritizing the new composition operator for processes with access permissions to simplify the model construction and so introduce the rule:
The stall S and time progression tick functions can be lifted to processes with access permissions in the obvious way.
Network terms in the RL model are now extended so that they are based on processes with access permissions:
@[@] : ALoc Prs AP → N ets
In order to model the apmod function, used in PerTiMo to record the permission updates that occur when a process migrates, we introduce a function apm(@, @)(@) : ALoc ALoc AP Set → AP Set. For a given PerTiMo example, appropriate rules need to be given to specify the behaviour of this function and to facilitate this we introduce functions 
where not Eq(ap1, ap2) is a Boolean function which checks whether two access permissions are different.
We now need to consider how to modify the RL model to take account of the changes made to the action rules in PerTiMo (see Table 3 ). By carefully considering Table 3 we observe that only the (Move) and (Com) rules have to be substantially revised. We modify the rule labelled [move] which models the action rule (Move) in TiMo so that it updates the access permission set associated with the process which is migrating:
where aps is a variable of sort AP Set representing a set of access permissions and pp is a variable of sort Prs A P representing a process associated with an access permission set. The remaining rule that allows time to pass requires only a slight modification (shown to illustrate the minor changes required to most rules):
The rule labelled [calls] for modelling the action rule (Calls) on process definitions needs a slight modification and becomes:
where id(u 1 , . . . , u n : s 1 , . . . , s n ) df P id and RL(P id ) is the process term that results from translating P id into RL(TMP).
The final action rule that needs significantly extending is the communication action rule (Com). The existing RL rule is extended to the following conditional rule:
The above updated process transition rules can then be combined as before into a strategy step P that captures the maximal concurrent update step that occurs in a derivation step in PerTiMo:
step P ⇒ repeat * (dc(calls P, moveP, com P)) We can then combine the above parts into a rewrite rule oneStep P which extends the previous rule oneStep for TiMo to take account of access permissions:
The above allows PerTiMo network specifications to be mapped to a corresponding RL model which can then be simulated and analysed using a rewriting tool such as Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02] . A simple illustrative example of this is presented in Sect. 5.3 below. What now remains is to show formally that the proposed mapping into RL correctly preserves the semantics of PerTiMo.
Recall 
It can be shown that oneStep P preserves valid network terms. 
In a slight abuse of notation, we also let σ AP ({ap 1 , . . . , ap n }) denote the lifting of σ AP to sets of access permissions, defined by
The network term mapping
To establish the correctness of the RL model we need to prove it is sound and complete with respect to PerTiMo (see Fig. 4 for a pictorial representation of these correctness properties). each atomic process term (pt i : aps i ) is involved in at most one process transition rule application when oneStep P is applied. This gives us four possible cases to consider for each (pt i : aps i ): 1) no process transition rule is applied and time simply progresses; 2) [calls P] rule is applied; 3) [moveP] rule is applied; and 4) [com P] rule is applied. Cases 1) and 2) are straightforward adaptations of the cases in the proof of Theorem 4.2 and so we focus on the remaining two cases here.
For Case 3), suppose pt i has the form go(nt, at ) then npt and that a [moveP] rule is applied to migrate the process to a new location resulting in the network term at [S (npt : apm(at, at )(aps i ))]. Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. Then by the action rule (MoveP) in Table 3 we must have
AP (apm(at, at )(aps i )) ]] The result then follows since the stall symbol will be removed by the time progression step in PerTiMo.
For Case 4), suppose that the [com P] rule has been applied to two process terms pt i and pt j , for i j . That is, suppose
The instances of the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of oneStep. Clearly, for the above conditional rule [comP ] to be applicable the condition (AP ( put, ct, at) in aps i ) and (AP (get, ct, at) in aps j ) must have evaluated to true. Then it follows by the definition of the term mapping and RL(TMP) that put ct@at ∈ σ −1 AP (aps i ) and get ct@at ∈ σ −1 AP (aps j ) must hold. By the action rule (ComP) in Table 3 we then have
Prs (pt Proof. The proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Theorem 4.3 and relies on a case analysis of the possible action taken to update each atomic process in a derivation step. It suffices to consider a well-formed PerTiMo network of the form at
where n > 0 and each P i is an atomic process. Now suppose
for some finite set of at-actions {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m }, m ≥ 0. Then it can be seen that each atomic process P i is involved in at most one at-action ψ i . We need to show that the at-action applied to each process P i is correctly captured by the oneStep P strategy in RL(TMP). There are four possible cases to consider for each process P i : 1) None of the action rules (CallP), (MoveP) and (ComP) are applied in the derivation step; 2) The action rule (CallP) is applied; 3) The action rule (MoveP) is applied; and 4) The action rule (ComP) is applied. Cases 1) and 2) are straightforward adaptations of the cases in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and so we focus on the interesting aspects of Cases 3) and 4) here.
In Case 3), suppose P i has the form go nt at then P . Then we have 
Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. The result then follows since we can show
] using the definition of the term mapping and RL(TMP). In Case 4), suppose the action rule (ComP) has been applied to two processes P i and P j , for i j , i.e.
where the stall symbols will be removed by the final time step. Now we have
by the definition of σ Net . Clearly, we must have that put ct@at ∈ i and get ct@at ∈ j if the (ComP) action rule has been applied. It follows that (AP ( put, ct, at) in σ AP ( i )) and (AP (get, ct, at) in σ AP ( j )) must also hold by definition of the term mapping and RL(TMP). We can therefore apply the
where all occurrences of the stall symbol S will be removed by the tick function. It is then straightforward to see that
by definition of σ Net and since we can show σ Prs ({at /vt}P
An illustrative example for PerTiMo
In this section we illustrate the RL model we have developed for PerTiMo by using Elan to simulate and analyse a simple network system with access permissions. Recall the simple PerTiMo specification Check A P introduced at the beginning of Sect. 5. Then we can apply the approach described in Sect. 5.2 to map Check A P into an RL model RL(Check A P). To illustrate RL(Check A P) and help clarify the definition of the [callsP ] rewrite rules, consider the following two rewrite rules that capture the (Calls) action rule for the two process definitions in Check A P: The trace contains five derivation steps and this can be shown to be the minimum needed in order to allow a process req to migrate from location Sa f e to the secure location Ar ea.
Next we consider whether a process starting from another initial location (represented by Other here) can gain access to Ar ea using the following network:
By applying a simple search strategy using Elan to the translated network term we are able to confirm that it is not possible for the process starting from Other to reach Ar ea even when initially given the required access permission. These results are in-line with those derived using the judgement rules in Sect. 5.1.
Conclusions
TiMo [CiK08] is an appealing process algebra proposed for prototyping software engineering applications where time and mobility are combined. PerTiMo [CiK11b, CiK14] extended TiMo with interprocess communication controlled by access permissions that processes must possess in order to send and receive information. Moreover, processes can acquire new access permissions, or lose some of their current access permissions while moving between locations, modelling an important security feature. Crucially, it is possible to verify that a migrating process possesses a sufficiently rich set of initial access permissions so that whenever it attempts to communicate over a channel at a certain location, it has the required access permission, irrespective of the other processes used in the overall system. Both TiMo and PerTiMo use local clocks and local maximal concurrency of actions, and such choice of semantics is motivated by the assumptions made by the GALS approach [Das06] , which specifies that systems operate under a 'globally asynchronous/locally synchronous' execution strategy. Related models can be found in the literature, such as the timed π -calculus [Ber04] , timed distributed π -calculus [CiP06] , and timed mobile ambients [AmC07] . The distributed π -calculus also incorporates an explicit notion of location, and dealing with static resources access [Hen07] by using a type system. Several systems encompass various forms of access control policies in distributed systems. Other related work on access control in distributed systems has been done in the context of the language Klaim and its extensions [Bet03, Bet05] . Another example is [BuG07] which uses cryptographic operations and capability types to obtain a secure implementation of a typed π -calculus.
Rewriting Logic (RL) [Mes92] provides a well-supported logical framework for modelling concurrent systems and has been used to model a range of process algebra languages. In [MaM96, MaM02] a model of CCS is developed using RL, though this model is not fully executable by tools such as Maude [CDEL02] . This work is extended in [VeM05] by using the reflective properties of Maude to develop a fully executable model of CCS. This interesting paper also provides a comprehensive model for the LOTOS [Lot89] specification language. A high-level discussion of the use of Elan for prototyping π -calculus specifications is provided in [Vir96] but while the use of strategies is mentioned no specific details are provided. The RL model of TiMo presented here appears to be novel in its use of strategies to cope with maximal parallel computational steps.
In this paper we used RL to develop a model and implementation of both TiMo and PerTiMo. The RL model was based on developing a strategy which can capture a maximal parallel computational step of a TiMo specification, including its time rule based previously on negative premises. We have then provided an operational semantics for PerTiMo by modifying our RL semantics of TiMo, and investigated the safety of communication and migration in terms of access permissions. This illustrates the significant flexibility and extendibility provided by using the RL framework with strategies. We have also formally shown the correctness of the resulting semantics by proving it is both sound and complete. We illustrated how the Elan tool and, in particular, its user defined strategies can be used to model and analyse TiMo and PerTiMo specifications. While the examples used are intentionally simple for brevity, they still provides an interesting first insight into the range of properties that can be investigated.
The development of analytical and verification techniques continues to be our main concern at the present moment-especially in order to deal with static timing analysis-initial results in this direction have been reported in [CKS12] . Developing efficient support tools for PerTiMo is part of the work, and we see this paper as key step forward.
In future work we intend to investigate extending our approach to handle other security related aspects of software engineering designs, such as allowing access permissions (at particular locations) to control process migration, adding security levels for migrating processes, allowing messages to contain access permissions, and analysing security policies for access and migration control. Interestingly, the RL model allows a range of semantic choices for PerTiMo to be considered by changing the derivation step strategy (e.g. adding priorities or fairness assumptions) and we are currently investigating these different semantic choices. We also intend to perform a variety of verification case studies to illustrate the practical application of our methods and investigate its limitations. Finally, we note that at present the analysis of TiMo and PerTiMo specifications is limited by the search capabilities and efficiency of Elan. Work is now underway to develop Maude [CDEL02] implementations of the RL model presented here with the aim of improving both the range and efficiency of model analysis.
